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land, in which he concluded that "during the period between 1860 and
and 1915 no definite trend appeared in the native fertility rates" [38,
p. 34]. For the period from 1915 through 1925 (the last year of the
study), he found an upward tendency in fertility. Here, then, is an
area in the forefront of the process of urbanization and industrializa-
tion in which native white fertility did not significantly decline over a
long period stretching well back into the 19th century.14 The appear-
ance of a similartern for the nation as a whole at a later date would
clearly be consistent with this earlier New England experience.
One final point should be noted regarding Figure 4. The decline of
total native white fertility in the 1920's is now seen to be owing more
to a decrease in rural than urban fertility. Between 1915-19 and 1925-
29, the reduction in rural fertility was close to 10 per cent, while that
for urban was under 6 per cent. Thus further understanding
of this period calls particularly for an explanation of the rural decline.
E. Summary
While the fertility of the total white population declined substan-
tially from the latter part of the 19th century to the mid-'thirties, there
was significant variation in the rate of change over time and among
component population groups. Even after averaging data so as to elimi-
nate or substantially reduce variability due to the business cycle,
marked fluctuations—Kuznets cycles of 15 or more years duration—
stand out in the patterns for the total, native, and foreign-born white
populations. Moreover, in the first three decades of this century the
over-all decline in total white fertility was owing almost exclusively to
declines for the foreign-born white and rural native white populations
and to the shift from rural to urban areas; the fertility of the urban
native white population, the group of central importance in under-
standing recent and prospective movements in the aggregate, remained
virtually unchanged. Considerations such as these raise the question
whether the baby boom, rather than an abrupt reversal in a long-term
down-trend, might not be at least in part a Kuznets cycle of much
larger magnitude than heretofore. To answer this, itis necessary to
look into possible reasons for these movements.
II. Reasons for Kuznets Cycles in Fertility of
Different Population Groups
Briefly stated, the analytical viewpoint underlying the subsequent
discussion is this: variations in the fertility of a given population group
"A recent re-examination by Robert Gutman [171 of the reliability of the Massachu-
setts birth registration data used by Sperigler, while arriving at a somewhat different eval-
uation from Spengler, does not upset this finding.14 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
are caused primarily by changes in two classes of factors—economic
condition and demographic composition. The "group" for which these
factors should be studied comprises those in the family-building ages.
Broadly, this embraces those aged 15-44 years, but for some purposes
particular attention should be paid to the younger members, those
aged, say 20-29, where so many decisions regarding marriage and
childbearing are concentrated. "Economic condition" refers to the em-
ployment and income experience of the group. Ideally, "income" here
would embrace all sources, including even interpersonal transfers from
other age groups, though in the following discussion attention is con-
centrated on the chief source, labor income. "Demographic composi-
tion" refers to the distribution of the group according to characteristics
such as age, sex, nationality, and parentage. A change in demographic
composition may itself stem basically from economic forces, for ex-
ample, a change in age composition of the foreign-born due to a rise
in immigration, but it is nevertheless useful to distinguish the different
channels through which these forces operate. Both economic condition
and demographic composition may affect the over-all fertility of a pop-
ulation group by influencing either marriage behavior, marital fertility,
or both. No consistent effort is made here to distinguish the role of
these two components in over-all fertility change, though it would be
of interest in a fuller treatment.15
The analysis below for the foreign-born takes up only compositional
factors, while those for the two native-born groups concentrate on eco-
nomic condition. It would have been of interest to examine,.where pos-
sible, the influence of economic factors on foreign-born fertility in so far
as they exert effects other than through compositional change, and of
changes in demographic composition on native-born fertility, especially
those associated with rural-urban migrationY In the present discussion,
however, we have not attempted an exhaustive analysis, but have
This brief statement of analytical viewpoint is intended merely to highlight the de-
terminants studied here. Among other possibly important factors are variations in the
competitive situation of children in the consumers' scale of preference associated, e.g., with
the introduction of new consumer durables or a change in the net income which children
add to the family (see Joseph S. Davis 19, pp. 56-58] and Gary S. Becker [70, pp. 209-
31]);changes in the availability of credit resources; and shifts in techniques and knowledge
of birth control.Mention should also be made of a stimulating paper by Moses Abram-
ovitz [2, pp. 158-79] which touches on some of the longer-term forces shaping contem-
porary attitudes toward fertility.
A cursory look at the available data on compositional aspects of the native white
rural and urban populations suggests that they exhibit much less decade-to-decade varia-
bility than the foreign-born white. See the 1890-1930 figures in Thompson and Whelpton
[45, Tables 41 and 56, and App. Tables 17, 23, and 271. While there are some excellent
recent general studies on U.S. population [6] [411, it is unfortunate that there is nothing
that continues this remarkable study to the present in its full analytical depth.AMERICAN BABY BOOM 15
singled out those factors which seemed on the basis of our initial in-
vestigation to throw significant light on the Kuznets cycles shown by
each group.
A. Foreign-Born White Fertility
As populations go, the is an unusual one—primarily
because the source of its growth is immigration rather than births.17
One result of this is a very atypical age distribution. Unlike the usual
age distribution of a growing population, where the numbers tend to
fall progressively with each older age group, that of the foreign-born
shows a concentration in the middle age groups with relatively small
numbers at the extremes, at least as long as immigration remains high
[45, p. 144]. Moreover, not only are the additions to this population
fed in at relatively advanced ages—the "prime" working ages—but
there is a significant disproportion between the sexes, with males no-
ticeably predominating. Finally, given wide swings in immigration,
such as have occurred in this country, the relative size even of adjoin-
ing age-sex groups can fluctuate widely in as short a period as a decade.
These considerations explain our starting with demographic com-
position in seeking clues to the variations in the rate of change of
foreign-born fertility. Our immediate point of departure in studying
these movements, particularly the very steep decline in the 1920's was
the observation that the proportion of young foreign-born women who












Why, one may ask, should such an abrupt decline occur? The chance
of a foreign-born white woman aged 20-24 by 1920 being married was
almost two in three, but if she reached this age group only one decade
later, the likelihood had declined to less than one in two.
An obvious hypothesis, stemming from the observation that the mar-
riage proportion for young foreign-born men remained almost constant
over the decade, is that the demand for women to marry dropped off
Children born to foreign-born women after immigration are, of course, classified as
native-born.16 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
because of a decline in the relative number of males in the market [25]
[46]. In testing this, however, one must recognize that the relevant
ratio is not that of males to females in a given age group, the standard
sex ratio, since, as is well known, men typically marry at alater age
than women. For example, in the period 1890-1930, at least 45 per cent
of foreign-born white women were married by the time they were 20-
24, but for foreign-born white men this proportion was not attained
until ages 25-29 had been reached [45, p. 395]. In attempting to ex-
plain the marriage proportion for foreign-born white women aged 20-
29, therefore, the ratio of foreign-born white males aged 25-34 to fe-









1890 1900 1910 1920 1930
FIGURE 5. FoREIGN-BORN WHITE POPULATION, RAIJo oi MALES AGED 25-34
TO FEMALES AGED 20-29, AND PER CENT OF LATTER MARRIED, 1890-1930
Source:TableA-5
Therelevant series are plotted in Figure 5 for the decennial census
dates 1890-1930. The close similarity between the patterns traced by
the two curves—a similarity which would not appear if the standard
sex ratio for those aged 20-29 were used—isimpressive. Apparently,
the marital experience of young foreign-born white females did depend
Theanalysis implies of course that native-born men did not constitute a particularly
important source of demand for foreign-born women. This assumption seems consistent
with the facts;in1920 the proportion of foreign-born mothers whose husbands were
native-born was less than one in six 1156,p.2321.AMERICAN BABY BOOM 17
very considerably on the gyrations of our rather unorthodox sex ratio,
which in turn arose from the impact of both earlier and current im-
migration on the age-sex structure of the foreign-born population.19
In Figure 6, this line of reasoning is pushed a step further. Here, at
five-year intervals, the series for foreign-born white fertility and our
marriage-relevant sex ratio (the two solid lines) are compared, the
latter being used in the absence of direct observations on the marriage
proportion at mid-census dates. As the lower panel shows, while the
movements in the rates of change of the two series are not perfectly
consistent, there is a noticeable similarity. Both series show two trough-
to-trough swings with the dates of peaks and troughs close, if not iden-
tical. This suggests that at least one element responsible for Kuznets
cycles in the rate of change of foreign-born fertility was the changing
proportion of males aged 2 5-34 to females aged 20-29 and the conse-
quent effect of this on the marriage proportion.
The broken line in the figure brings out a second demographic fea-
ture of the foreign-born population that may have contributed to the
fertility swings, namely, the proportion of women aged 20-44 in prime
reproductive ages, conceived here as encompassing ages 20-34. Here
too there is a suggestion of two trough-to-trough swings with reason-
ably consistent timing, though the amplitude of the movements is some-
what smaller for this series. However, in the beginning of the period
(for which the estimates are probably less reliable), the timing re-
lationships are somewhat off.
This brief discussion of Kuznets cycles in the rate of change of
foreign-born white fertility is designed to be exploratory rather than
definitive, and enough has perhaps been said to provide some support
for the view that shifts in demographic composition of the foreign-
born associated with the changing impact of immigration were at least
in part responsible for these movements. Even if one accepts this sug-
gestion, however, there remain some troublesome discrepancies. One—
of particular interest in the present analysis—is that in the latter part
of the period considered here, the decline in the rate of change of fer-
tility was somewhat greater than one would have expected on the basis
of the two factors so far discussed. One possible explanation, suggested
in several sources, and consistent with the emphasis here on composi-
tional changes in the population, is an abrupt decline in the proportion
of foreign-born women in the prime reproductive ages who came from
the high-fertility countries of southern and eastern Europe. There is
19Aninteresting by-product of the sharp decline in the marriage-relevant sex ratio
during the 'twenties, and the corresponding reduction in the proportion of foreign-born
white females aged 20-24 who were married, was an abrupt rise in the labor-force partici-
pation of this group from 37.6 to 50.1 per cent [33,TableA-41.18 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
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FIGURE 6.FOREIGN-BORNWHITE POPULATION, LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE
OF FERTILITY RATIO, AND OF RATIO OF MALES 25-34TOFEMALES 20-29
ANDFEMALES 20-34TOFEMALES 20-44,
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substantial evidence that female immigrants from this area typically
had significantly higher fertility than contemporaneous immigrants
from northern and western Europe [57, pp. 4, 10] [69] [16, p. 108].
Clearly, a sudden drop in the share of young foreign-born women from
this source would tend to depress fertility.
Direct evidence to test this proposition is not available since, during
the period with which we are concerned, the census did not regularly
publish age detail for the foreign-born by country of origin. However,
it seems possible to form a rough impression of the validity of the
argument. In the period 1890-1915, about two-thirds of all female im-
migrants came from southern and eastern Europe; in 1915-30, about
one-third. We have attempted to estimate, therefore, for foreign-born
women aged 20-34 at each of several dates, the proportion who had
immigrated between 1890 and 1915, the peak period of the "new im-
migration."2° The results are as follows: 1900 =45,1910 =82,1920
=86,1930 =48.The figures clearly suggest a drastic decline during
the 'twenties in the share of young foreign-born women accounted for
by the new immigration,21 and 'thus appear consistent with the sugges-
tion that the decline in the rate of change of foreign-born fertility
during this decade, attributable in part to the demographic shifts previ-
ously noted, was aggravated by this factor.
B. Rural White Fertility
The explanation investigated here for Kuznets cycles in rural fer-
tility is a simple one; namely, that the rate of change of rural fertility
varies directly with that in the economic condition of the farm popu-
lation in family-building ages, approximated here by real farm income
per head of the farm population (or labor force) as a whole. If the
rate of growth of real farm income per head drops off, the rate of
change of farm fertility would be expected to decline (algebraically).
The converse is true if the rate of farm income growth increases.
The analysis comprises two parts, one for 1885-89 through 1925-29
based on observations at decennial intervals; and one, employing
averages at quinquennial intervals, for 1920-24 through 1954-58. In
The technique for 1930, for example, was to compare the number of survivors from
the group of foreign-born women aged 5-19 in 1915, estimated by appropriate survival
rates from [31, p. 23], with the number aged 20-34 enumerated in 1930.
Thompson and Wheipton draw an opposite conclusion, namely, that the share ac-
counted for by the new immigration rose during the decade and thus could not
have contributed to the fertility decline [45, pp. 271-72]. The procedure they use to infer
the share of the new immigration, however, rests primarily on figures for foreign-born
women of all ages, and fails to take account of the fact that the major shift in national
origins of immigration in the 'twenties particularly affected the younger foreign-born age
groups, those central to the explanation of fertility.20 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
the first part of the analysis, we use fertility data for the total rural
white rather than native rural white population, since the earlier esti-
mates for the former are probably somewhat more reliable for the
present purpose and the bias introduced by the inclusion of the rela-
tively unimportant foreign-born group in the rural total is probably
fairly small. This series is compared with five-year averages of real
gross farm income per person engaged in farming. The dates chosen
for the latter allow for a lead of one to one and a half years over the
fertility series. In the second part of the analysis, annual estimates of
the birth rate for the total farm population (white plus nonwhite), con-
verted to five-year averages for the first and second half of each dec-
ade, are compared with real net farm income per head of farm popu-
lation, again with allowance for a lead of the former over the latter.22
Both the quinquennial and decennial farm income series are deflated by
an index chosen to approximate the cost of living to farmers. The series
are plotted in the upper panel of Figure 7, and the percentage change,
our particular interest, in the lower.
By and large, as the lower panel shows, the data seem reasonably
consistent with the hypothesis—at least as consistent as one might hope
given the shortcomings of the data and the inevitable limitations of any
monocausal explanation. Swings in the rate of growth of real farm in-
come per head or per worker appear to be matched fairly closely by
swings in the rate of growth of rural fertility. Reference to the adjoin-
ing scales will show that the magnitude of the income swings is sub-
stantially greater than that of fertility. This might be interpreted as
suggesting an elasticity noticeably under one, a result which seems con-
sistent with the findings of similar business cycle analyses.23
If this reasoning is accepted, then the historical course of rural fer-
tility change in this century would be conceived as reflecting in sig-
nificant measure the pattern of major surge and relapse which has
characterized farm income growth. The accelerated rate of decline of
farm fertility in the 'twenties and early 'thirties would be attributed
to the drastic setback to the growth of farm income in the period fol-
lowing the First World War, a decline so great that the absolute level
itself was substantially reduced. The subsequent baby boom in rural
areas would be explained by the corresponding resurgence in farm in-
come growth in the late 'thirties and 'forties associated particularly
with the war and postwar booms. And finally, the decline in the rate
"The shift to the farm birth rate series is due in part to statistical convenience, but
more fundamentally to the fact that the connection between fertility and farm
income becomes progressively more tenuous as the rural nonfarm population grows.
23Cf.the studies of Gary S. Becker P0. pp. 209-311, Dorothy S. Thomas [131[431,
Dudley Kirk [70, pp. 241-57] [48, pp. 84-85].a
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FIGURE 7. LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF RURAL WHITE FERTJLITY RATIO (R.F.R.)
AND REAL GRoss FARM INcoME PER ENGAGED (Yw), 1885-89/1925-29,
AND OF FARM BIRTH RATE (F.B.R.) AND REAL NET FARM INCOME
PER HEAD (Yp), 1920-24/1954-58
Source:Tables A-7a and A-7b.
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of growth of fertility in the 1950's, which in terms of absolute level
meant a leveling off, would be explained by the tapering off of the
farm boom and substantial drop in farm-income growth. The data sug-
gest that the adverse effect on fertility in this most recent per.iod has
been somewhat less than might have been expected. A number of pos-
sible reasons for this come to mind, such as compositional changes, the
increased significance of nonfarm sources in the total income of farm
families [40, pp. 48-491, and the progressive rise in the proportion of
the "farm" population (1950 census definition) not engaged in agri-
culture [611; but it is not possible to pursue these questions here.
From what has been said, it should be clear that the fertility trend
for the total white population has been subject to substantial variation
as a result of major fluctuations in the fertility of the foreign-born and
rural white components. The fluctuations for these groups in turn ap-
pear to have been caused by the impact of the rise and fall of immigra-
tion on the age, sex, and nationality composition of the foreign-born,
and of major swings in agricultural conditions on the economic con-
dition of the farm population. It would seem to follow that generaliza-
tions based on the fertility record of the total white population (or of
the entire population, whose behavior is of course dominated by the
total white) would be extremely hazardous.
Consider, for example, the experience of the 1920's. If the foregoing
analysis is correct, the striking decline in total white fertility that oc-
curred in this decade was caused largely by the conjuncture of two ex-
ceptional circumstances—narnely, major shifts in the demographic com-
position of the foreign-born population arising from the effect on im-
migration of the First World War and the subsequent imposition of
restrictions, and, second, a major slump in agricultural conditions.
When added to the continuous depressing influence of the rural-urban
shift, these circumstances created a decline in white fertility noticeably
out of line with previous experience. Knowing this, one is inclined to
view with some reserve statements such as that quoted previously,
which cites the sharp fertility decline for the total population in the
prosperous 1920's as a reason for discounting the effect of economic
conditions on fertility.
It is nevertheless true that even urban native white fertility declined
in this decade, though the decline of under 6 per cent for this group
is rather less impressive than the almost 20 per cent decline for the
white population as a whole. It is time, therefore, to see what might ex-
plain the fertility pattern for this group.
C. Urban Native White Fertility
As in the rural analysis, the aim here is to explore the relation be-
tween Kuznets cycles in fertility and in the economic condition of theAMERICAN BABY BOOM 23
population of family-building ages. For the rural population, it seemed
reasonable to assume that the economic experience of those in family-
building ages could be inferred from the income experience of the farm
population as a whole. Such an assumption, however, does not seem
plausible for the urban group, with its much more varied distribution
of industrial and occupational attachments. In the absence of direct in-
formation on the situation of those in family-building ages, therefore,
we have attempted to infer the state of the labor market for young per-
sons from two indicators, conceived as reflecting respectively the de-
mand and supply sides of the market. The first is the unemployment
rate for the labor force as a whole. A low rate is taken as reflecting a
generally favorable state of demand for labor, young and old; a high
rate, an unfavorable situation. The second is the rate of change of the
total white male population, aged 20-29, taken as a crude index of the
rate of entry of young persons into the labor market. Other things
equal, a decrease in the rate of entry would make for a favorable labor
market for young persons because of their scarcity; an increase, an un-
favorable market. Thus the hypothesis is that the rate of change of
urban native white fertility varies directly with that of aggregate labor
demand (read "inverted unemployment rate") and inversely with that
of the rate of labor market entry of young persons (read "rate of
change of white male population, aged 20-29")
Anexample may clarify the reasoning. If the economy is experienc-
ing a Kuznets-cycle expansion, the rate of growth of labor demand
would increase, and, other things remaining unchanged, one would ex-
pect this to lead, through its effect on income and employment condi-
tions, to a favorable response in fertility of the native population by
encouraging marriage and childbearing. However, under conditions of
free immigration, the increased rate of growth of labor demand would
also provoke an influx of immigrants. The resulting rise in the rate of
additions to the labor market would tend to counteract the tendency to-
ward tightening and thus offset in some measure the stimulus to fertil-
ity of the native-born. Note, in this connection, that immigrants are
typically concentrated in exactly those age groups in which we are in-
terested for the analysis of fertility. Conversely the tendency toward
an adverse impact on native-born fertility of a decreased rate of growth
Although the view that variations in the general unemployment rate primarily reflect
changes in aggregate demand seems most consistent with formal theory; itis not essential
to the analysis. Alternatively, one might think of movements in the general unemployment
rate as indicating the average course of employment conditions, and the net outcome of
aggregate demand and supply, and changes in the rate of entry as indicating variations
in the deviation from the average of the situation for young persons. However, the fact
that for most of the period covered •here a rise in the rate of entry accompanied a reduc-
tion in unemployment seems consistent with the emphasis on aggregate demand (Table
A—8, cols. 2, 3).24 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
of labor demand during a Kuznets-cycle contraction would be mod-
erated by a decrease in the rate of immigration. Thus Kuznets cycles
in the rate of change of labor demand would tend to be compensated
by swings in the rate of entry into the labor market owing to immigra-
tion, and the consequent impact on native-born fertility would be coun-
teracted in some
Figure 8 presents the relevant series; as before, the upper panel
shows the levels of the variables, the lower, their rates of change. To
facilitate inferences from the graph, the curve for each of the explana-
tory variables ha.s been plotted inverted so that an upward movement
would be expected to cause an upward movement in the fertility curve,
other things remaining unchanged.
If we first consider variations in the decade rates of change through
1935-39, the most interesting feature is the inverse movements of the
two explanatory series. As the lower panel shows, whenever the rate of
growth of aggregate labor demand (the lower solid line) moves in a
way favorable to fertility, the change in the rate of entry of young
persons into the labor market (the broken line) moves adversely, and
vice versa. In the early part of the period the swing in supply condi-
tions reflects chiefly movements in immigration—exactly the situation
described in the example above. Later, the supply movement reflects
primarily variations arising from demographic sources. For example,
the increase in the decade 19 15-19/1925-29 over the preceding decade
reflects an exceptional rise in the rate of increase of native white males
aged 20-29, which traces in turn to a corresponding movement in the
total white birth rate earlier in the century.
So far as directions of movement of the explanatory series during
this period are concerned, therefore, they carry no clear implication
regarding the expected behavior of the rate of change of fertility—a
plus in one is accompanied by a minus in the other. And, indeed, the
fertility curve fails to exhibit the fluctuations of either of the two ex-
planatory series. Rather, one finds simply one extended swing from the
beginning of the period through 1925-29/1935-39. The 'twenties, with
a relatively small decline in the rate of change of fertility, form a con-
sistent part of this picture, a favorable movement in demand con-
ditions being offset by an adverse one in supply. Interestingly, if one
were to smooth out fluctuations in the two explanatory curves by, say,
a simple two-item moving average, both, and particularly the unem-
ployment rate, would show an extended swing rather similar to that of
Sonic may note a similarity between this reasoning and Francis Walker's analysis
emphasizing the adverse influence of immigration on the fertility of the native population
[7111[72]. Walker, however, was concerned with the primary trend, whereas the present
analysis refers only to Kuznets cycles, and in addition takes account of the stimulating



















FIGURE 8. LEVEL AND RATE OF CHANGE OF URBAN NATIVE WHITE FERTILITY RATIO
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (U), AND RATE OF








1885-89 95-99 05-09 15-19 25-29 35-39 45-49
to to to to to to to
95-99 05-09 15-19 25-29 35—39 45-49 54-5826 AMERICANBABY BOOM
the fertility curve. An average of the two explanatory curves would
produce the same effect.
Still more intriguing is the behavior of the three series after 1935-
39. In this period, the rate of change of labor demand continues its pat-
tern of rise and fall, with a swing of noticeably greater amplitude than
previously. In striking contrast to the preceding pattern, however, the
change in the rate of entry into the labor market levels off instead of
fluctuating inversely. And, for the first time, the rate of change of fer-
tility exhibits a Kuznets-cycle movement, reproducing with remarkable
similarity the fluctuation in the rate of change of labor demand. The
inference suggested by these movements seems clear. With immigra-
tion restricted and without a surge in the rate of labor market entry
from the native-born population caused by demographic processes, the
favorable impact of a swing in the rate of growth of demand—itself
much larger than heretofore—was felt with much greater force by the
young native whites in the labor market. As a result, the rate of change
TABLE 2—OBSERVATIONS ON PERCENTAGE RATE OF CHANGE PER DECADE IN URBAN NATIVE
WHITE FERTILITY CLASSIFIED BY CONCURRENT CHANGE PER DECADE IN PERCENTAGE
OF LABOR FORCE UNEMPLOYED AND IN PERCENTAGE RATE OF CHANGE OF TOTAL
WHITE MALES, AGED 20—29,1885—89/1954—58
Change per Decade in Percentage
Rate of Change of Total White
Males, Aged 20—29
(percentage points)
Change per Decade in Percentage Unemployed
(percentage points)












of fertility of this group reproduced the swing in labor demand in
significant measure for the first time.
If one considers magnitudes of the variables rather than simply
rates of change, the argument seems reasonably well borne out, though
the correlation is not perfect. In Table 2, each of the seven observa-
tions on the rate of change in fertility is classified according to the
accompanying values of the rate of change in the unemployment rate
and in the percentage change in white males aged 20-29. One finds
that, holding the change in rate of entry into the labor market constant
(that is, examining each row in the table separately), the rate of change
of fertility varies directly with the rate of change in demand (inversely
with the rate of change in the unemployment rate). Conversely, hold-
ing demand conditions constant (examining each column separately),
there is a tendency for the rate of change of fertility to vary inverselyAMERICAN BABY BOOM 27
with the change in the rate of entry into the labor market, though in
this case there is one inconsistency (the + 18 and 0 entries being out
of order vertically). Whether this discrepancy primarily reflects a fun-
damental deficiency in the analytical scheme or an inadequate approxi-
mation to the economic condition of those of family-building age pro-
vided by the explanatory series used here, it is not possible to say.
A comprehensive measure of the income and employment experience
of young persons for the period covered here remains tantalizingly out
of reach. Yet such additional evidence as we have been able to assemble
supports the view that the income experience and labor market situa-
tion of young persons were exceptionally favorable in recent years.
Consider the
1. In the 'forties, earnings in the lower-income occupations rose much
more rapidly than those in the higher, and then, in the 'fifties, at about
the same or a slightly lower rate [51, No. 33 (Jan. 15, 1960), pp. 6-7,
and No. 35 (Jan. 5, 1961), p. 52]. Since young people are more highly
concentrated in lower-income occupations than older, they must have
particularly benefited from the movement of the 'forties. The very I rag-
mentary evidence available suggests no corresponding development in
the 'twenties.
2. The shift of young persons into higher earning occupations pro-
ceeded at a much higher rate in the 'forties than in the two preceding
decades. In 1940, 17 per cent of males aged 15-24 in nonfarm occupa-
tions were in the three highest income classes (professional, technical,
and kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors, except farm;
and craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers). By 1950, 41 per cent
of this same group of males (now aged 25-34) were in these classes, an
improvement of 24 percentage points. From 1920 to 1930, the improve-
ment for the cohort moving through the same ages was 17 points, and
from 1930 to 1940 it was 12 points. Corresponding figures for the
cohorts aging 25-34 to 35-44 in the three successive decades are 7, 4,
and 14 points. Other things being equal, this more rapid shift to higher-
income occupations points to a significantly higher rate of income
growth for young persons in the 'forties than in the two preceding dec-
ades.27
In the examples cited, the typical movement from the 'thirties through the 'fifties is
consistent with the pattern shown by the rate of change of fertility—that is, the abrupt
break with past experience, in a direction reflecting a particularly favorable situation for
young persons, occurs between the 'thirties and the 'forties. The movement from the
'forties to the 'fifties suggests a slowing or even reversal of the process. It is likely that
between the first and second halves of the 'fifties this pattern would be still more apparent.
21Thefigures for 1930-50 are computed from [22, Appendix Table 1]; for 1920, from
unpublished estimates comparable to [221 kindly provided by W. Lee Hansen. Data for
armed forces as reported in the census were included with the 1940 and 1950 figures. I
am indebted to Adrian Throop for assistance in assembling these figures.28 AMERICAN BABY BOOM
3. Expansion of government transfer payments provided a new bul-
wark to income in the 'forties and 'fifties, especially in the form of
veterans benefits and unemployment compensation for younger persons.
4. Labor-force participation rates in the 'forties showed a marked
break with previous trends in a manner strongly suggesting a shortage
of young workers. The sharp downtrend in participation of white males
aged 14-19 which had prevailed since 1900 was completely reversed. A
similar movement appears even to have characterized those aged 10-13
[31, pp. 364-67]. The long-term rise in labor-force participation of
older women was greatly accelerated because jobs that would ordinarily
have been filled by young persons were left open. And while, for young
women as a whole, labor-force participation declined slightly as a larger
proportion married and had children, the rates for wives, even those
with preschool-age children, rose substantially. Finally, while it is not
possible to cite figures on the long-term trend, part-time employment
rose substantially after 1940, and it seems likely that this too stemmed
at least in part from a shortage of young workers. In the 'fifties the
rise in labor-force participation .of older women continued virtually un-
abated, but the rate for those aged 14-19 resumed its long-term de-
cline.28
5. Since 1940, home ownership among young persons has risen to
levels markedly higher than had previously prevailed. The following
figures for nonf arm household heads show, for each age group, the per-
centage of dwelling units which were owner-occupied at each date:29
Age 1890 1900 1930 1940 1949 1959
15-24 14 10 11 12 21 16
25-34 24 21 26 22 35 42
35-44 35 34 44 37 53 63
Thereis a marked advance in the situation of young persons after
1940, part of which must be due not only to a great increase in credit
availability but to a substantially improved income position as well
which encouraged taking on long-term commitments.
28Theevidence citedinthis paragraph is from the excellent census monograph by
Gertrude Bancroft [5,pp.29-3 1, 58, 77-82, and Ch. 41. Further analysis of some of these
developments is planned as part of a study by the present writer on long swings in
American labor-force growth [121.
20The data through 1940 are from the census reports; for 1949 and 1959, from [211,
p. 1107, Suppl. Table 1]. (Data for those aged 18-24 from the latter source were adjusted
to 15-24 on the assumption that no heads of households under 18 own their own homes.)
The 1930 and 19-10 estimates are for male heads of household only, which biases them
slightly upward compared to the figures for the other dates. The assistance of S. R. Lewis,
Jr., in the preparation of these data is gratefully acknowledged.AMERICAN BABY BOOM 29
6. Finally, there are the characteristics of the baby boom itself. A
recent study [16] has shown that a major factor in the boom has been
the significant decline since 1940 in age at marriage. From 1890 to
1940, age at marriage drifted irregularly downward, the decline in the
median for all females amounting to only one-half year. In the next
decade, a period one-fifth as long, the reduction was twice as great
[55, Series A-229]. In addition, wives have had children much sooner
after marriage. These two factors, earlier marriage and earlier child-
bearing, rather than mothers having substantially more children, ac-
counted for most of the rise in the fertility rate through 1954 [16, pp.
365-7 1]Thecentral role of young families in the baby boom is ob-
vious. It would be difficult indeed to account for this unless their in-
come and employment experience had been exceptionally good.
III. Conclusions and Possible Implications
The most striking feature of the baby boom—and thus the one call-
ing most urgently for explanation—is the apparent abrupt break with
historical experience. However, reconciliation of present and past be-
comes easier when one recognizes that even before the 'forties the his-
torical record was characterized by fluctuations of significant magni-
tude and duration, and that the record for the total white population
is a composite of the varying experience of several component groups,
subject in part to quite different influences. Major swings in agricul-
tural conditions, on the one hand, and Kuznets cycles in nonagricul-
tural activity with accompanying immigration fluctuations, on the
other—each with their peculiar historical timing—gave rise to dis-
tinctive fertility responses on the part of the rural white, foreign-born
white, and urban native white populations. When one unravels these
differing strands of experience and considers their underlying influ-
ences, the impression emerges that the recent fertility behavior of the
urban native white population, the group of central significance for
explanation of the baby boom, is not as inconsistent with its earlier
character as was heretofore believed. In the first three decades of the
Thedraft law policy of deferring fathers doubtless encouraged earlier marriage and
childbearing, but without an income situation that favored expansion of the family beyond
the first child, it is doubtful that it could have produced a baby boom of the type experi-
enced.
There is now reliable evidence that the average number of children per mother has also
risen in the postwar period. This development is of course consistent with the analysis
presented here. The longer the exceptional labor market situation prevails, the more likely
the fertility response will take this form in addition to earlier marriage and earlier child-
bearing.